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Abstract A verifiable multi-secret sharing (VMSS) scheme enables the dealer to share
multiple secrets, and the deception of both participants and the dealer can be detected. After
analyzing the security of VMSS schemes proposed by Mashhadi and Dehkordi in 2015, we
illustrate that they cannot detect some deception of the dealer. By using nonhomogeneous
linear recursion and LFSR public key cryptosystem, we introduce two new VMSS schemes.
Our schemes can not only overcome the drawback mentioned above, but also have shorter
private/public key length at the same safety level. Besides, our schemes have dynamism.
Keywords: Verifiable multi-secret sharing; Nonhomogeneous linear recursion; LFSR public
key cryptosystem; Key length; Dynamism
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of Internet, the secure storage and transmission of infor-
mation have become more and more important. The security of the information depends
on the security of the cryptosystem, which depends on the keys used in the system. It
is obviously insecure to have only one key holder, therefore secret sharing was proposed
to solve the problem by distributing the keys among several members, which is significant
to not only prevent the overcentralization of the key management but also guarantee the
integrity and confidentiality of the keys.
However, there are some problems in the initial secret sharing scheme:
(1) They can only share one secret once;
(2) They need secure channel to distribute shares;
(3) They cannot perceive the detective behavior of both the dealer and the participants;
(4) The shares held by participants cannot be reused;
(5) If participants join in or quit from the scheme, all the shares need to be updated;
(6) When the dealer changes the threshold, all the shares need to be altered.
1
In order to overcome the weakness of the original scheme, researchers have proposed
several improved schemes in recent years. In 2004, Yang et al. presented a new multi-
secret sharing scheme(YCH)[10]. Based on Feldman’s scheme [3], Shao et al. proposed
an improved scheme [9] in 2005, which still needs a private channel. In 2006, Zhao et al.
proposed an effective VMSS scheme (ZZZ) [11]. Since public key cryptography is utilized
in the verification phase, the private channel is unnecessary.
In 2008, Massoud and Samaneh [2] presented two efficient VMSS schemes, which employ
the intractability of the discrete logarithm and RSA cryptosystem [8] to modify the YCH
scheme. For simplicity, we call the first scheme in [2] MS1 scheme, and the second scheme
in [2] MS2 scheme. In 2016, Liu et al. [6] found that ZZZ scheme, MS1 scheme and MS2
scheme cannot resist cheating by the dealer, and proposed two modified schemes utilizing
RSA encryption system. Similarly, we call the first scheme in [6] LZZ1 scheme, and the
second scheme in [6] LZZ2 scheme. In 2015, Massoud and Samaneh proposed two new
VMSS schemes (MS schemes) [7] by nonhomogeneous linear recursions and LFSR public
key cryptosystem [4, 5]. Likewise, the two schemes have the same drawback as the schemes
in [2], and we call the first scheme in [7] MS3 scheme, and the second scheme in [7] MS4
scheme.
In this work, we will present two new dynamic VMSS schemes using LFSR public
key cryptosystem based on the MS schemes [7], which overcome the disadvantages of the
previous schemes and have shorter key length than the schemes in [6]. Moreover, our schemes
allow participants to join in or quit from the group optionally and let the dealer to change
the number or value of shared secrets, even the threshold according to practical situation
dynamically.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the nonhomo-
geneous linear recursion, the LFSR public key cryptosystem, and give the attack to MS
schemes. In Section 3, we present our two schemes. We propose the security analysis in
Section 4, while Section 5 gives the performance analysis. Finally, we conclude our schemes
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Linear recursion
In this subsection, we introduce the linear recursion briefly, which you can refer to[1]
for a detailed description.
Definition 1. A linear recursion is defined by the equations:
{
u0 = c0, u1 = c1, · · · , uk−1 = ck−1,
un+k + a1un+k−1 + · · ·+ akun = f(n) (n ≥ 0),
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where c0, c1, · · · , ck−1 and a1, a2, · · · , ak are predefined real constants. k is a positive vari-
able, the degree of this linear recursion. If f(n) = 0, the linear recursion is homogeneous.
Otherwise, it is nonhomogeneous.
Definition 2. For a linear sequence un(n ≥ 0) with dgree k defined above, we give the
following concepts:
(1) Auxiliary equation: xk + a1x
k−1 + · · ·+ ak = 0.
(2) Generating function: U(x) = Σ∞n=0unx
n.
Lemma 1. We assume that sequence un(n ≥ 0) withe degree k, and its auxiliary equation is
(x−α1)
m1(x−α2)
m2 · · · (x−αl)
ml = 0, where m1+m2+ · · ·+ml = k. Then its generating
function is
U(x) =
R(x)
(1− α1x)m1(1− α2x)m2 · · · (1 − αlx)ml
,
where R(x) is a polynomial and deg(R(x)) < k.
And un = p1(n)α
n
1 + p2(n)α
n
2 + · · ·+ pl(n)α
n
l , where pj(n) = A0 +A1n+A2n
2 + · · ·+
Amj−1n
mj−1(j = 1, 2, · · · , l) and A0, A1, · · · , Amj−1 are constants defined by a1, a2, · · · , ak.
Our schemes use two examples of nonhomogeneous linear recursion(NLR) shown as
follows:
Theorem 1. Utilizing [NLR1] to generate NLR sequence (un)n≥0, where [NLR1] have the
following form:
[NLR1] =


u0 = c0, u1 = c1, · · · , uk−1 = ck−1,
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
un+k−j = (−1)
nc (n ≥ 0),
(1)
where c, c0, c1, · · · , ck−1 are predefined real constants. Therefore un = p(n)(−1)
n, where
p(n) is a polynomial of n with degree at most k.
Proof. Utilizing equation (1), we obtain( k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
xj
) ∞∑
n=0
unx
n = u0 + (u1 + ku0)x+ · · ·+
( k−1∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
uk−1−j
)
xk−1
+
( k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
uk−j
)
xk +
( k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
uk+1−j
)
xk+1 + · · ·
(1)
= u0 + (u1 + ku0)x+ · · ·+
( k−1∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
uk−1−j
)
xk−1
+ cxk − cxk+1 + · · ·
3
= g1(x) + cx
k(1− x+ x2 − x3 + · · · )
= g1(x) +
cxk
1 + x
=
g1(x)(1 + x) + cx
k
1 + x
where g1(x) is a polynomial with degree (k − 1). Consequently,
∞∑
n=0
unx
n =
g1(x)(1 + x) + cx
k
(1 + x)k+1
.
From Lemma 1, we can get un = p(n)(−1)
n, where p(n) is a at most k-degree polynomial.
Theorem 2. Utilizing [NLR2] to generate NLR sequence (un)n≥0, where [NLR2] have the
following form:
[NLR2] =


u0 = c0, u1 = c1, · · · , uk−1 = ck−1,
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(−1)jun+k−j = c (n ≥ 0),
(2)
where c, c0, c1, · · · , ck−1 are predefined real constants. Therefore un = p(n), where p(n) is a
polynomial of n with degree at most k.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be completed by the method analogous to Theorem 1.
2.2 The LFSR public key cryptosystem
At first, we introduce the third-order LFSR sequence [4, 5]. Assuming that f(x) =
x3−ax2+ bx− 1 is irreducible which is the characteristic polynomial of the following LFSR
sequences, where a, b ∈ F = GF (p) and p is a prime.
Definition 3. A sequence s = (sk)k≥0 satisfies the following conditions:{
s0 = 3, s1 = a, s2 = a
2 − 2b,
sk+3 − ask+2 + bsk+1 − sk = 0 (k ≥ 0).
Then, we call s = (sk)k≥0 is a third-order LFSR sequence whose characteristic polynomial
is f(x).
We denote sk as sk(a, b), s as s(a, b), then we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. [4]Let f(x) = x3− ax2+ bx− 1 over F = GF (p) generate the three-order LFSR
sequences s = (sk)k≥0. If s−k(a, b) = sk(b, a), then sk(se(a, b), s−e(a, b)) = ske(a, b) for all
positive integer k and e.
4
Definition 4. (The LFSR public key cryptosystem) A sender generates the public key and
private key by the following operation:
(1) selects two primes p and q, and computes N = pq. Notice that the next few steps are
performed on ZN and the period of the irreducible polynomial is δ = (p
2+p+1)(q2+ q+1);
(2) selects e such that gcd(e, pi − 1), where i = 2, 3;
(3) computes d such that de = 1mod δ;
(4) publishes e and N as public key, then keeps d as private key.
Enciphering:
In order to send m = (m1,m2)(0 < m1,m2 < N) to the receiver, the sender generates
c = (c1, c2) as corresponding cipher text, where c1 = se(m1,m2), c2 = s−e(m1,m2).
Deciphering:
When receiving c = (c1, c2), the receiver can get the corresponding plain text m1 =
sd(c1, c2),m2 = s−d(c1, c2) by private key d.
2.3 Attack to MS schemes
In this subsection, we give the attack to MS3 scheme, which is also true of MS4 scheme.
Please refer to [7] for details of MS schemes. When recovering the secrets, they merely
check the validity of I ′i = sei(se0(a, b), s−e0(a, b)) by sd(I
′
i, I
′
−i) = sei(a, b), where I
′
−i =
s−ei(se0(a, b), s−e0(a, b)), however, the consistency between I
′
i and {ui} is not checked. Thus,
a malicious dealer can deceive the participants successfully, which means that:
When 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
(1) D chooses a random c < q1 and substitutes Ri with R
′
i to calculate the equations
below: 

u0 = R1, u1 = R2, · · · , u
′
i−1 = R
′
i, · · · , uk−2 = Rk−1,
k∑
j=1
(
k − 1
j − 1
)
un+k−j = (−1)
nc mod q1 (n ≥ 0);
For k − 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ l, D calculates ui;
(2) D calculates yi = Ri − ui−1(k ≤ i ≤ m), and ri = Si − ui+m(1 ≤ i ≤ l);
(3) D releases (se0(a, b), d, r1, r2, · · · , rl, yk, yk+1, · · · , ym).
When k − 1 < i ≤ m,
(1) D chooses a random c < q1 and considers the sequence generated by the equations
below: 

u0 = R1, u1 = R2, · · · , uk−2 = Rk−1,
k∑
j=1
(
k − 1
j − 1
)
un+k−j = (−1)
nc mod q1 (n ≥ 0);
For k − 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ l, D calculates ui;
(2) D substitutes Ri with R
′
i to calculate y
′
i = R
′
i−ui−1, then calculates yj(k− 1 < j ≤
m, j 6= i) and ri = Pi − ui+n(1 ≤ i ≤ l) respectively;
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(3) D releases (se0(a, b), d, r1, r2, · · · , rl, yk, yk+1, · · · , y
′
i, · · · , ym).
In the reconstruction phase, because the replacement is barely perceptible by Pi, those
k participants still provide real Ri which conflicts with {ui} or {yi} generated by the dealer.
Therefore, the recovered secrets are wrong. However, any at least k honest participants
exclusive of Mi can reconstruct the shared secrets. Furthermore, if the dealer replaces more
than one Ri with invalid R
′
i , the situation gets even worse. In conclusion, the MS schemes
cannot resist attack by a malicious dealer.
3 The new VMSS schemes
To avoid the attack mentioned above, based on MS schemes [7], we present new VMSS
schemes by examining consistency, which can detect deception of both participants and the
dealer successfully.
3.1 Scheme 1
Scheme 1 utilizes the [NLR1], the LFSR public key cryptosystem and the discrete
logarithm problem.
3.1.1 Initialization phase
Suppose D be the dealer, P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pm} be participants, and k(k < m) be the
threshold.
Initialization of D:
(1) D selects p0, q0 (p0 > q0) of bit-length λ/2, where p0 and q0 are two strong primes.
Then D calculates N = p0q0 of bit-length λ. Note that λ here is the security parameter of
the LFSR public key cryptosystem.
(2) D randomly selects two primes Q, q with bit-length more than λ/2, satisfying Q|(q−
1), and Q >
(
k
i
)
for i = 0, 1, · · · , k.
(3) D selects g of Z∗q of order Q satisfying that the discrete logarithm problem with base
g in Z∗q is infeasible.
(4) D releases (λ,N,Q, q, g) to participants.
Initialization of participants:
(1) Pi of identity IDi selects two strong primes pi , qi (pi > qi), and then calculates
Ni = piqi (Ni > N). Note that the period of the irreducible polynomial in ZNi is δi =
(p2i + pi + 1)(q
2
i + qi + 1), then all the computations are performed in ZNi .
(2) Pi randomly selects an integer ei ∈ [2, δi] such that gcd(ei, p
j
i − 1) = 1, for j = 2, 3.
(3) Pi calculates the integer di satisfying eidi = 1mod δi.
(4) Pi passes (IDi, ei, Ni) to D with a public channel, and keeps its shadow di secret.
D releases (IDi, ei, Ni), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
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Remark 1. The released messages can be reused after this phase. In addition, D cannot
get any information about shadows, therefore these shadows are also reusable.
3.1.2 Construction phase
Let S1, S2, · · · , Sl ∈ ZQ be l secrets, where 0 < Si < Q(i = 1, 2, · · · , l). Then D
executes the steps as below to produce respective subshadow ui−1:
(1) D selects ci ∈ Z
∗
Q for i = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1 at random.
(2) D randomly selects a constant c satisfying c < Q and considers [NLR1] as below:
[NLR1] =


u0 = c0, u1 = c1, · · · , uk−1 = ck−1,
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
unk−j = (−1)
nc mod Q (n ≥ 0).
(3) For k ≤ i ≤ m+ l, D calculates ui.
(4) D calculates yi = Si − um+i−1 mod Q(i = 1, 2, · · · , l).
(5) D calculates Hi = sei(ui−1, ui−1)mod Ni and Ti = g
ui−1 mod q,(1 ≤ i ≤ m).
(6) D releases (H1, H2, · · · , Hm, T1, T2, · · · , Tm, y1, y2, · · · , yl, c, um+l).
Remark 2. According to Lemma 2, we know that s−k(a, b) = sk(b, a). If b = a, we have
s−k(a, a) = sk(a, a), which means that
Hi = sei(ui−1, ui−1)mod Ni = s−ei(ui−1, ui−1)mod Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
3.1.3 Verification phase
In order to obtain the subshadow ui−1, Pi calculates following formula:
ui−1 = s1(ui−1, ui−1)
= sdi(sei(ui−1, ui−1), s−ei(ui−1, ui−1))
= sdi(Hi, Hi)mod Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
By the formulas below, our schemes can perform validity and consistency detection.
k∏
j=0
(Ti+1+t−j)

 k
j


?
= g(−1)
ic mod q
Ti
?
= gui−1 mod q
Once the equations above are satisfied, each ui−1 is thought to be valid and in accord
with released messages. If every verification succeeds, participants think that D is not
malicious.
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3.1.4 Reconstruction phase
Suppose that at least k participants {Pi}i∈I(I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,m}) utilize corresponding
{ui−1}i∈I to reconstruct the secrets. Every Pi can detect the validity of {uj−1}j∈I(j 6= i)
using the formulas as below:
guj−1
?
= Tj mod q, j ∈ I, j 6= i.
The following two methods can be utilized:
Method 1: Using k valid subshadows {ui−1|i ∈ J ⊆ I, |J | = k} and the released um+l,
they can get the formulas by Theorem 1:
z1 + z2(i− 1) + · · ·+ zk+1(i − 1)
k = ui−1(−1)
i−1 mod Q, i ∈ {J ∪ (m+ l + 1)}.
Solving the equations or utilizing the Lagrange interpolation, they get z1 = A1, z2 =
A2, · · · , zk+1 = Ak+1 in ZQ.
Then, they obtain
ui−1 = (A1 +A2(i− 1) + · · ·+Ak+1(i− 1)
k)(−1)i−1 mod Q,
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m+ l + 1}/{J ∪ (m+ l + 1)}.
Therefore, they reconstruct the secrets: Si = yi + um+i−1 mod Q (i = 1, 2, · · · , l).
Method 2: If utilizing k successive {ui, ui+1, · · · , ui+k−1}, they can calculate other
uj , j ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m+ l}/{i, i+ 1, · · · , i+ k − 1} by the formulas:
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
un+k−j = (−1)
nc mod Q (n ≥ 0).
Therefore, they reconstruct the secrets: Si = yi + um+i−1 mod Q (i = 1, 2, · · · , l).
3.2 Scheme 2
Scheme 2 utilizes the [NLR2], the LFSR public key cryptosystem and the discrete
logarithm problem.
3.2.1 Initialization phase
The initialization phase in Scheme 2 is the same as Scheme 1.
3.2.2 Construction phase
Compared with Scheme 1 ,we substitute [NLR1] with the [NLR2], and the rest is the
same.
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3.2.3 Verification phase
Pi can calculate ui−1 = sdi(Hi, Hi)mod Ni(1 ≤ i ≤ m) to obtain corresponding sub-
shadow. By the formulas below, our schemes can perform validity and consistency detection.:
k∏
j=0
(Ti+1+k−j)
(−1)j

 k
j


?
= gc mod q
Ti
?
= gui−1 mod q
Once the equations above are satisfied, each ui−1 is thought to be valid and in accord
with released messages. If every verification succeeds, participants think that D is not
malicious.
3.2.4 Reconstruction phase
Suppose that at least k participants {Pi}i∈I(I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,m}) utilize corresponding
{ui−1}i∈I to reconstruct the secrets. Every Pi can detect the validity of {uj−1}j∈I(j 6= i)
using the formulas as below:
guj−1
?
= Tj mod q, j ∈ I, j 6= i.
Method 1: Using k valid subshadows {ui−1|i ∈ J ⊆ I, |J | = k} and the released um+l,
they can get the formulas by Theorem 2:
z1 + z2(i− 1) + · · ·+ zk+1(i− 1)
k = ui−1 mod Q, i ∈ {J ∪ (m+ l + 1)}.
Solving the equations or utilizing the Lagrange interpolation, they get z1 = A1, z2 =
A2, · · · , zk+1 = Ak+1 in ZQ.
Then, they obtain
ui−1 = A1 +A2(i− 1) + · · ·+Ak+1(i− 1)
k mod Q,
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m+ l + 1}/{J ∪ (m+ l + 1)}.
Therefore, they reconstruct the secrets: Si = yi + um+i−1 mod Q (i = 1, 2, · · · , l).
Method 2: If utilizing k successive {ui, ui+1, · · · , ui+k−1}, they can calculate other
uj , j ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m+ l}/{i, i+ 1, · · · , i+ k − 1} by the formulas:
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(−1)jun+k−j = c mod Q (n ≥ 0).
Therefore, they reconstruct the secrets: Si = yi + um+i−1 mod Q (i = 1, 2, · · · , l).
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Pi D Pi D
sei(a, b)
Ii = se0(sei(a, b), s−ei(a, b))
I ′i = sei(se0(a, b), s−e0(a, b))
Ri = H(Ii) = H(I
′
i)
Subshadow ui−1 =
{
Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
Ri − yi, k ≤ i ≤ m
MS schemes
se0(a, b)
ei
Hi = sei(ui−1, ui−1)mod Ni
ui−1 = sdi(Hi,Hi)mod Ni
Subshadow = ui−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
our schemes
Hi
Figure 1: The difference between MS schemes and our schemes
From the Figure 1, in MS schemes [7], every Pi selects ei independently, and computes
corresponding sei(a, b), then transmits it to D. Thereafter, D and Pi can obtain secret
share Ri = H(Ii) = H(I
′
i), where Ii = se0(sei(a, b), s−ei(a, b)), I
′
i = sei(se0(a, b), s−e0(a, b)).
However, whether the Ri used in the generation of {ui−1} is the same as the one provided
by Pi is not verified.
While in our schemes, Pi computes di and maintains confidentiality of D, then transmits
ei to D, where ei is relevant public key of di. Then D can get Hi by ei, where Hi =
sei(ui−1, ui−1)mod Ni. After that Pi can calculate its subshadow ui−1 by di. We add the
consistency detection between the ui−1 and released messages to perceive malicious dealer.
4 Security analysis
The security analysis of our two schemes is analogous, so we take Scheme 1 as example.
Generally, when it comes to the security of a (k,m) VMSS scheme, there are three conditions
to be satisfied.
(1)Correctness: Provided that all participants and their dealer behave authentically,
at least k participants can recover shared secrets successfully.
(2)Verifiability:
• In the verification phase, any participant can detect dishonest operation by the dealer.
• In the reconstruction phase, any other participants can detect a false subshadow by a
malicious participant.
(3) Privacy: Corruption of at most k − 1 participants cannot acquire any information
of secrets.
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4.1 Correctness
At first, in order to test the consistency of P ′is subshadow ui−1 with the released
messages, we must publish the predefined constant c. When c is unknown, the right side of
the following equation is indeterminate.
k∏
j=0
(Ti+1+k−j)

 k
j


?
= g(−1)
ic mod q.
Secondly, we explain the reason why we employ the [NLR1] in Scheme 1. If we still use
the original NLR sequence [7], which is

u0 = c0, u1 = c1, · · · , uk−2 = ck−2,
k∑
j=1
(
k − 1
j − 1
)
un+k−j = (−1)
nc mod Q (n ≥ 0).
We suppose that the corrupted k−1 participants are {P1, P2, · · · , Pk−1} with corresponding
subshadows {u0, u1, · · · , uk−2}. Then the attacker can calculate the whole NLR sequence
since c is released by the dealer D. In other words, an attacker corrupting k−1 participants
can get other honest participants’ subshadows, and the attacker can reconstruct the shared
secrets successfully.
Thirdly, since we use [NLR1] in the construction phase, we need construct a polynomial
p(x) with degree k in the reconstruction phase as shown in the Theorem 1. There are k+1
indeterminate coefficients in p(x), but we merely have k subshadows. Besides the k subshad-
ows provided by k honest participants, we need one more uj . Because {u0, u1, · · · , um−1}
are subshadows of participants P1, P2, · · · , Pm, and {um, um+1, · · · , um+l−1} are correlated
with the shared secrets S1, S2, · · · , Sl. Then um+l is the only term satisfying the demand.
Therefore, we release um+l in the construction phase.
Finally, if the dealer and the participants are honest, any at least k participants can
reconstruct the shared secrets using the two methods mentioned in the Section 3.1.4.
Remark 3. In fact, the aforementioned NLR sequence has degree k − 1. In MS schemes
[7], the constant c is not released. Therefore, the designer must use a k − 1-degree NLR to
satisfy the requirement of a secure (k,m) VMSS scheme.
To sum up, we employ the [NLR1] for the following reasons:
(1) The constant c has to be released for verifying the consistency of P ′is subshadow ui−1
with released messages.
(2) A k-degree NLR sequence is utilized and the term um+l has to be released to make
Scheme 1 be a secure (k,m) VMSS scheme.
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4.2 Verifiability
In the verification phase, if ui−1 is valid, and D succeeds in providing a false u
′
i−1 to
Pi(ui−1 6= u
′
i−1), which means that Ti = g
ui−1 = gu
′
i−1 mod q, and
k∏
j=0
(Ti+1+k−j)

 k
j


= g(−1)
ic mod q.
Because ui−1, u
′
i−1 ∈ ZQ, the possibility of ui−1 6= u
′
i−1 can be neglected. Then we conclude
that u′i−1 = ui−1, which means that D cannot distribute a false u
′
i−1 to Pi successfully.
Besides, once a malicious Pi succeeds in providing a false u
′
i−1 during the reconstruction
phase, the other participants get Ti = g
ui−1 = gu
′
i−1modq, which implies u′i−1 = ui−1modQ.
Then the dishonest Pi can be discovered.
4.3 Privacy
Because Ti = g
ui−1 mod q(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) and the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗q
with the base g is hard, the attacker gets no helpful messages of ui−1 from T1, T2, · · · , Tm. If
the attacker wants to obtain messages of ui−1 from Hi, where Hi = sei(ui−1, ui−1) mod Ni
for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, he must break the LFSR public key cryptosystem, which is impossible
under our assumption.
Not mastering at least k subshadows, the attacker cannot utilize the NLR sequence
(uj)j≥0 to get um, um+1, · · · , um+l−1. Then, the attacker gets nothing about shared secrets,
namely um + y1, um+1 + y2, · · · , um+l−1 + yl.
Theorem 3. The corruption of at most k−1 participants cannot obtain any helpful messages
of the secrets.
Proof. The attacker cannot obtain any helpful messages of the [NLR1] from Ti and Hi.
Therefore, in order to obtain honest participants’ subshadows, the attacker can only uti-
lize the at most k − 1 corrupted participants’ subshadows. We might as well assume
{P1, P2, · · · , Pk−1} to be the malicious participants. The attacker can merely get the NLR
sequence (un)n≥0 from the formulas below by {u0, u1, · · · , uk−2} and released constant c:

u0 = c0, u1 = c1, · · · , uk−2 = ck−2,
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
un+k−j = (−1)
nc mod Q, n = 0, 1, · · · ,m− k − 1.
There are m − k linear equations, but m − k + 1 variables uk−1, uk, · · · , um−1. Then the
attacker has to select the value of uk−1 in ZQ randomly, which implies the probability to
get other participants’ subshadows successfully is 1/Q. Since Q > 2
λ
2 , the probability is
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less than 1/2
λ
2 . Therefore, the corruption of at most k − 1 participants cannot obtain any
helpful messages of the secrets.
5 Performance analysis
In this section, we compare some proposed VMSS schemes with ours from four aspects.
5.1 Computational cost
As for the computational cost, since the modular exponentiation costs the great amount
of time, Table 1 displays the difference in some presented schemes and ours. And Table 2
demonstrates the cryptographic knowledge used in the four phases of these schemes.
Table 1: Computational cost
Scheme
Initialization Construction Verification Reconstruction
D Pi D Pi Pi
MS1[2] m 1 m - k − 1
MS2[2] 0 1 m+ 1 - k
LZZ1[6] 0 0 m+ k(l ≤ k) k + 2(l ≤ k) (k − 1)(l + 1)
LZZ2[6] 0 0 2m k + 3 k − 1
our schemes 0 0 m k + 3 k − 1
Table 2: Cryptographic knowledge used in cited schemes
Scheme Initialization Construction Verification Reconstruction
MS1[2]
MS2[2]
RSA
Diffie-Hellman
HLR
RSA
RSA
Diffie-Hellman
HLR or
Lagrange
Interpolation
LZZ1[6] RSA
(l − 1)-degree polynomial or
(k − 1)-degree polynomial
RSA
RSA
Diffie-Hellman
Lagrange
Interpolation
LZZ2[6] RSA
HLR
RSA
RSA
Diffie-Hellman
HLR or
Lagrange
Interpolation
MS[7]
LFSR PK
cryptosystem
NLR
LFSR PK cryptosystem
LFSR PK
cryptosystem
NLR or
Lagrange
Interpolation
our schemes
LFSR PK
cryptosystem
NLR
LFSR PK cryptosystem
LFSR PK
cryptosystem
Diffie-Hellman
NLR or
Lagrange
Interpolation
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From Table 1, we know that our schemes are the most effective in first two phases. Com-
pared with the schemes in [6], our schemes replace the RSA encryption scheme by LFSR
public key cryptosystem in the construction phase, which can be seen from Table 2. This re-
placement decreases the number of modular exponentiation used in the construction phase of
our schemes. Since we append consistency check to detect the malicious dealer, our schemes
need more modular exponentiations than the first two schemes and MS schemes [7] in the
verification phase. Because the schemes in [7] do not utilize the modular exponentiation,
we do not list it in Table 1.
5.2 Communication cost
We give the communication cost in the first two phases of some schemes in Table 3.
It implies that new VMSS schemes are as effective as MS1, MS2, MS schemes in the first
phase, but a little less effective in the second phase, owing to the fact that we request D
to provide released messages for detecting the malicious behavior of the dealer. The serious
consequences of this shortage is showed in the Section 2.3.
Table 3: Communication cost
Scheme
Initialization Construction
D Publish Pi to D D Publish
MS1[2]
(e,N, g, q, α)
(IDi, Ti), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(IDi, Ti),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(r,G1, G2, · · · , Gm, r1, r2,
· · · , rl, yk+1, yk+2, · · · , ym)
MS2[2]
(N, g, q, α)
(i, Ri), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(i, Ri),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(R0, f, r1, r2, · · · , rl,
yk+1, yk+2, · · · , ym)
LZZ1[6]
(λ,N,Q, q, g)
(IDi, ei, Ni), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(IDi, ei, Ni),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
l ≤ k, (C1, C2, · · · , Cm,H1,H2,
· · · ,Hm, A1, A2, · · · , Ak)
l > k, (C1, C2, · · · , Cm,H1,H2, · · · ,Hm,
η1, η2, · · · , ηl−k, A1, A2, · · · , Al,
f(η1), f(η2), · · · , f(ηl−k))
LZZ2[6]
(λ,N,Q, q, g, α)
(IDi, ei, Ni), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(IDi, ei, Ni),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(H1,H2, · · · ,Hm, T1, T2, · · · , Tm,
Y1, Y2, · · · , Yl)
MS[7]
(N, a, b, q1)
(IDi, sei(a, b)), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(IDi, sei(a, b)),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(se0(a, b), d, r1, r2, · · · , rl, yk, yk+1, · · · , ym)
our schemes
(λ,N,Q, q, g)
(IDi, ei, Ni), i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(IDi, ei, Ni),
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
(H1,H2, · · · ,Hm, T1, T2, · · · , Tm,
y1, y2, · · · , yl, c, um+l)
5.3 Dynamism
In this subsection, we will illustrate how to process a dynamic update, cancel, and
addition of the participants, the values of secrets and the threshold according to the actual
situation.
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Participants:
If a fresh participant Pnew wants to participate in the scheme, it computes Nnew =
pnewqnew, where pnew and qnew are strong primes. Then it chooses an integer enew and
calculates the corresponding secret shadow dnew , then sends (IDnew, enew, Nnew) to D.
Next D calculates Hnew = senew (unew−1, unew−1)modNnew and Tnew = g
unew−1modq, then
releases them. When it comes to canceling a Pcan, D merely eliminates (IDcan, ecan, Ncan).
Once Pcan tries to utilize ucan−1 to recover the secrets, it is impossible not to be detected.
Secrets:
If D wants to append a secret Sl+1, he merely calculates and releases yl+1 = Sl+1 −
um+(l+1)−1. Similarly, if D wants to reduce a secret Si, he merely eliminates yi = Si −
um+i−1. When D wants to alter the value of the secrets, the manipulation is completely
evident.
Threshold:
In addition, as we analyzed in Section 4.1, our schemes are secure (k,m) VMSS schemes.
If D wants to change the threshold of our schemes, he only need utilize a new NLR sequence
with a corresponding degree. For example, if we use the NLR sequence with k−1 degree, our
schemes are secure (k− 1,m) VMSS schemes, which is executable easily. Since the schemes
in [7] are (k,m) VMSS schemes, in order to compare them with ours, we also require that
our schemes are secure (k,m) VMSS schemes.
5.4 Performance characteristic
We analyze the performance characteristic of the schemes in [2, 6, 7] and our schemes
in Table 4.
• Characteristic 1: Recover multiple secrets simultaneously
• Characteristic 2: Usage of the public channel
• Characteristic 3: Detect deception of malicious D
• Characteristic 4: Detect deception of malicious Pi
• Characteristic 5: Change the shared secrets after an unsuccessful reconstruction phase
• Characteristic 6: Recycle of the shadows with diverse D
• Characteristic 7: Recycle of the shadows when participants join in/quit from the group
• Characteristic 8: The bit length of private key in a 1024-bit finite field
• Characteristic 9: The bit length of public key in a 1024-bit finite field
From Table 4, MS1, MS2 and MS schemes cannot detect deception by maliciousD, while
LZZ1, LZZ2 and our schemes can overcome the drawback. However, in a 1024-bit finite field,
the length of the private or public key in our schemes are denoted by only 340 bits, while
in [6] the length is three times longer to achieve the same safety level, which implies our
schemes are more efficient and have lower consumption. Besides, in MS1 [2] scheme, the
shadows of participants cannot be reused after reconstructing the secrets. Therefore, the
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Table 4: Performance characteristic
Characteristic MS1[2] MS2[2] LZZ1,2[6] MS[7] our schemes
1 YES YES YES YES YES
2 YES YES YES YES YES
3 NO NO YES NO YES
4 YES YES YES YES YES
5 NO NO NO NO NO
6 NO YES YES YES YES
7 YES YES YES YES YES
8 1024 1024 1024 340 340
9 1024 1024 1024 340 340
participants have to operate the first phase repeatedly, while our schemes allow them to
reuse shadows, which reduces the consumption of initialization.
6 Conclusion
Dynamic and verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes share multiple secrets among a set
of participants and detect the deception by malicious participants and the dealer dynam-
ically. Utilizing the nonhomogeneous linear recursion and LFSR public key cryptosystem,
we propose two efficient dynamic and verifiable multi-secret sharing schemes.
First, our schemes conquer the drawback of MS schemes [7] by adding consistency
check between the participants’ corresponding subshadows and released messages. Second,
although our schemes have the same advantage as the schemes in [6], we have less compu-
tational cost. Furthermore, since we substitute the RSA encryption scheme by the LFSR
public key cryptosystem, the private/public key length of our schemes is only one-third of
the schemes in [6] for the same safety level.
The final analyses of the proposed schemes indicate that they are secure and effective
(k,m) VMSS schemes, permitting recovery of multiple secrets simultaneously, using the
public channel, detecting deception of both a malicious dealer and participants, reusing the
shadows, having dynamism attribute, and having shorter public/private key length.
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